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Abstract
In response to consumers' growing interest in how products are sourced, produced, and distributed, organizations are increasingly transparent about their supply chain sustainability practices. Supply chain transparency (SCT) efforts are
intended to signal positive information about the company to consumers but the
benefits are often unclear, especially when consumers receive multiple, but mixed
signals that include negative events. We draw on signaling theory to explore how
consumers develop impressions of a company's products based on different evaluative dimensions: the positive integrity signal of SCT and the negative capability
signal of a product recall. The incongruent signal set creates ambiguity for consumers in assessing product quality and subsequent purchase decisions. We
develop two scenario-based experiments to test aspects of interdimensional signal
incongruence. Experiment 1 investigates the magnitude of signal incongruity by
considering combinations of different levels of SCT and product recall severity.
Experiment 2 investigates the temporal effect of the incongruent signals, considering the restorative effect of SCT after a product recall signal has been received.
While product recall signals are salient for consumers in shaping perceptions of
product quality and purchase intentions across both experiments, we demonstrate
the strategic value of SCT as a positive integrity signal to consumers.
KEYWORDS

consumer perceptions, product recalls, signaling theory, supply chain transparency,
sustainable operations

Highlights
• Disclosing sustainable supply chain initiatives to consumers can have a
positive impact on building a relationship with consumers.
• This form of transparency helps at least partially shield firms from negative
events such as a product recall.
• Firms should think about developing transparency about their sustainable
supply chain practices as a strategic initiative to protect against, and recover
from, adverse events (exemplified as a product recall in this research).

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited.
© 2022 The Authors. Journal of Operations Management published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Association for Supply Chain Management, Inc.
J Oper Manag. 2022;1–22.

wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/joom

1

2

1 | INTRODUCTION
Strong consumer pressure, aided by technology and
social media, is fostering a transformation of organizational strategies from a sole focus on profit to pursuit of a
broader set of sustainability outcomes (Nichols et al.,
2019; Tang, 2018). In the food sector, large global companies such as Nestlé and Unilever have been pursuing a
plethora of sustainability initiatives for many years that
span their supply chains. For example, Nestlé publicizes
its aim to “achieve sustainable, resilient food supply
chains” (Nestlé 2021), and provides web-site evidence of
responsible sourcing initiatives, support for regenerative
agriculture, and water management, among other sustainability initiatives. Likewise, Unilever's sustainable
sourcing programs focus on high standards when sourcing from their network of suppliers, driving change
through their supply base through continuous improvement policies, leading the transformation toward regenerative agricultural practices, and disclosing information
about their sustainable sourcing practices to consumers
(Unilever, 2021).
Unilever's emphasis on disclosing their sustainability
practices to consumers demonstrates that consumers are
increasingly recognized as important stakeholders and
constituents of firms' supply chains (Kirchoff et al., 2017;
Ta et al., 2015). The company explicitly states that communication to consumers is linked clearly to their
brands, demonstrating that the company recognizes that
consumers “care how the products they buy are sourced,
produced, and brought to market” (Nichols et al., 2019,
p. 536). Scholars have begun to address this supply chainconsumer relationship (Abbey et al., 2019; Akturk
et al., 2018; Simpson et al., 2019; Ta et al., 2018), particularly within the realm of supply chain sustainability,
addressing issues such as upstream supplier practices or
internal operations, often focusing on the important relationship between sustainability practices and firm performance (Duan, Aloysius, & Mollenkopf, 2022; Duan,
Hofer, & Aloysius, 2021; Goebel et al., 2018; Wiengarten
et al., 2019; Wilhelm et al., 2016).
Proactively disclosing relevant information and
engaging with consumers about upstream operations and
the products sold to consumers embodies the practice of
supply chain transparency (SCT) (Sodhi & Tang, 2019),
which is considered an important facet of sustainable
supply chain management (Carter & Easton, 2011;
Carter & Rogers, 2008). Not surprisingly, food supply
chains are a particularly important arena in which to
develop SCT. Consumers' concerns about ingredients,
farming, and processing methods (e.g., organic, genetically modified organisms, pesticide and antibiotic use),
and food safety heighten consumers' interest in knowing
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more about the quality of the foods they consume. While
some authors ascribe transparency as a builder of trust
within consumer food chains (Roth et al., 2008), others
assert that the benefits of disclosure remain unclear,
especially in light of unanticipated or undesirable events
which could lead to negative consumer reactions
(Sodhi & Tang, 2019).
Firms that disclose information about their environmental and social practices indubitably do so with the
intention of building trust with consumers, to further
enhance their brand or organizational reputations. Patagonia, for example, exemplifies that disclosure of its sustainability practices leads to more positive consumer
perceptions (Caniato et al., 2012) by signaling its commitment to sustainability (Sodhi & Tang, 2019). Yet, in this
age of social media and internet-enabled news/
information platforms, consumers receive a multitude of
signals about firms, not all of which might be positive.
Consumers' perceptions of companies and their products
are shaped by the mixed-signal sets they receive
(Connelly et al., 2011; Plummer et al., 2016; Stern
et al., 2014). Product recall news, for example, represents
a negative signal. Such signals may interfere with a firm's
more positive, strategically designed SCT efforts
(Connelly et al., 2011). The need for a recall suggests an
operational failure on the part of the firm, which we purposefully contrast with the more strategic efforts a firm
makes to disclose its sustainability efforts. Hence, in this
research, we focus on intentionally disclosed positive
information about a firm's sustainability efforts (SCT),
coupled with negative information about product recalls1
to understand how and when consumers respond to information about a firm's sustainable supply chain processes
and operations.
We build on recent work (Duan, Hofer, &
Aloysius, 2021; Nichols et al., 2019) by focusing on the
mechanism of SCT—that is, a firm's intentional disclosure
of information to its consumers about its sustainable supply chain practices, in the face of other conflicting information that consumers could receive. By using signaling
theory as our theoretical foundation (Spence, 1973), we
address contemporary thinking on consumers receiving
competing, incongruent signals (Connelly et al., 2011;
Paruchuri et al., 2021). By examining an incongruent signal set, we tease out the benefits of SCT as a controllable
mechanism within the arsenal of strategic tools available
to supply chain managers as they engage with external
stakeholders such as consumers.
We conduct three pretests and two scenario-based
experiments to assess consumer reactions to intentionally
disclosed information about a dairy firm's sustainability
practices in light of a product recall. We employ middlerange theorization, using top–down theoretical
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contextualization (Craighead et al., 2016; Stank
et al., 2017) to explain how the positive signal of SCT and
the negative signal of a product recall constitute an interdimensional set of incongruent signals that impacts consumers' product quality perceptions and repurchase
intentions. Signaling theory is well established in management research, and increasingly being employed in
supply chain management research to explore sustainability issues (e.g., Duan, Aloysius, & Mollenkopf, 2022;
Duan, Hofer, & Aloysius, 2021; Hofer et al., 2012;
Jacobs, 2014; Ketchen et al., 2014; Thomas et al., 2021).
Therefore, the sustainable supply chain context provides
fertile ground for examining SCT as a mechanism for
constructive engagement between firms and consumers.
The pretests (detailed in the appendices) validate the primary theoretical arguments around consumers' interpretation of different signals: first, that the intentional
disclosure of sustainability-related supply chain information (SCT) acts as a positive product quality signal and
second, that when combined with a product recall
(a negative signal), the two signals create interdimensional signal incongruence (Paruchuri et al., 2021),
in which the negative information of the product recall is
weighted more than the positive information contained
in the SCT signal.
Our two main experiments build on the theoretical
notion of an interdimensional set of incongruent signals,
in which we explore magnitude and temporal aspects of
SCT and product recall signals. Experiment 1 investigates
the impact of various levels of interdimensional signal
incongruity by considering combinations of different
levels of SCT and product recall severity. Hence, we provide insights into how the positive signal of SCT can
shield companies from at least some of the negative
effects of a negative product recall signal. Experiment
2 explores the temporal sequence of interdimensional signal incongruence—an important signaling theory extension that remains uninvestigated to date (Plummer
et al., 2016; Taj, 2016). Specifically, this experiment sheds
light on how the sequence of a negative signal followed
by a positive signal leads to changes in consumer sentiments. We show that SCT serves as a strategic tool to
regain positive product quality perceptions lost due to an
operational capability failure.

2 | B ACKGROUND
2.1 | SCT
Scholars are slowly coalescing around a clear and consistent definition of transparency (Bell et al., 2016; EgelsZandén & Hansson, 2015; Mol, 2015; Pagell & Wu, 2009;
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Sodhi & Tang, 2019). Schnackenberg and Tomlinson
(2016) have argued that the lack of a clear definition
limits scholars' ability to understand the role of transparency, particularly with respect to firm performance and
relationships between firms and their stakeholders. They
define organizational transparency as “the perceived
quality of intentionally shared information from a
sender” (p. 1788), suggesting that disclosure must be
intentional, timely, and relevant, coherent and understandable to the receiver, and accurate (within the confines of the sender-receiver relationship). While the term
is now generally thought of as “disclosure of information” (Mol, 2015, p. 154), concepts such as visibility and
traceability also involve information sharing. For example, Pagell and Wu (2009) distinguish between traceability and transparency by emphasizing the nature of
information shared internally (traceability) vis-à-vis
information shared externally (transparency). More
recently, researchers have clarified that visibility refers to
information sharing within the firm or supply chain (with
traceability being an aspect of visibility that relates to
provenance) whereas transparency refers to information
disclosure to external stakeholders, such as consumers or
investors (Sodhi & Tang, 2019).
Two important themes emerge within the literature
regarding SCT. The first theme is that focal attention to
stakeholders is paramount. The focus on external stakeholders began with the “right-to-know” movements of
the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, which resulted
in legislation and changed business practices to reduce
information asymmetries between firms and their stakeholders, thus holding organizations more accountable for
their actions (Egels-Zandén & Hansson, 2015; Mol, 2015).
Recent research demonstrates the growing accountability
of firms to their consumers, as firms increasingly recognize consumers as active and strategically important participants in their supply chains (Esper et al., 2003;
Esper & Peinkofer, 2017; Mena & Bourlakis, 2016;
Peinkofer et al., 2015; Ta et al., 2015), and supply chain
scholars address the impact of information disclosure on
consumer responses (Allon & Bassamboo, 2011;
Peinkofer et al., 2016; Ta et al., 2018).
The second theme relates to sustainability. Supply chain
strategy has become highly focused on sustainability, due to
recognition of supply chain managers' key role in impacting
a firm's environmental and social performance, in addition
to the more traditional focus on economic performance
(Carter & Easton, 2011). As such, transparency has been
receiving attention as a key facet of sustainable supply
chain management (Carter & Rogers, 2008; Sodhi &
Tang, 2019). This is particularly important as firms increasingly address issues of how to become more sustainable
(Castillo et al., 2018; Pagell et al., 2013).
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Sustainable supply chain management has long
employed a stakeholder lens to support the rationale that
firms should care about environmental and social outcomes (Carter & Jennings, 2004; Hofer et al., 2012; Sarkis
et al., 2010). Such a values-laden approach emphasizes
the link between business and ethics (Freeman, 1999),
providing the basis for the introduction of supply chain
integrity as an enabler of a firm's ability to meet its sustainable supply chain objectives (Castillo et al., 2018).
Fundamentally, supply chain integrity represents a
values-culture blend that encompasses both moral and
structural dimensions as firms employ sustainable supply
chain strategies (Douglas et al., 2021). Importantly, transparency plays a key role in supporting a firm's ability to
communicate to stakeholders the consistency of its supply chain actions with stated sustainability objectives.
(Castillo et al., 2018).
Within the theoretical domain of signaling theory, the
focus on supply chain integrity as an important antecedent to sustainable supply chain management practices
(Castillo et al., 2018; Douglas et al., 2021) clearly positions SCT as an integrity signal. Management and social
psychology researchers have established that stakeholders develop impressions of organizations along both
integrity and capability dimensions (Connelly et al., 2016;
Fiske et al., 2007; Paruchuri et al., 2021). The integrity
dimension refers to an organization's “adherence to
accepted ethical, regulatory and normative principles”
(Paruchuri et al., 2021, p. 563). Thus, communicating
SCT to consumers can be considered an act of integrity,
in which firms attempt to clearly signal their intent,
actions, and consistency of working toward their stated
sustainability goals.
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Pillutla, 2000; Germann et al., 2014), lower consumerperceived product quality, and reduced repeat purchase
behaviors (Ahluwalia et al., 2000; Cleeren et al., 2008;
Munyon et al., 2019).
In the face of a clear operational capability failure,
scholars have identified different strategies to manage
and mitigate consumers' negative reactions. Strategies
developed prior to a recall can protect a firm's performance in the case of a product recall. Such pre-emptive
strategies can have a positive spillover effect on consumer
reactions in the case of a negative event. For instance,
brand equity (Cleeren et al., 2008), commitment
(Germann et al., 2014), and reputation (Grunwald &
Hempelmann, 2010) have each been shown to mitigate a
product recall's negative impact on consumers. In contrast, strategies employed after an operational failure
such as a recall can help a firm recover from negative
consequences. Researchers have addressed brand advertising after a recall (Cleeren et al., 2013), as well as
increased frequency, timing, and intensity of corporate
social responsibility activities after a recall (Noack
et al., 2019) as means to mitigate post-recall damages.
When considering the operational capability failure of
a product recall, the negative consequences are well
known. However, when a negative capability signal is
coupled with integrity-based signal effects, the consequences remain unclear. Particularly important to identify is how SCT efforts—which reflect a firm's intention
to convey positive sustainability-related information to
consumers—interact with the negative signals consumers
receive about a product recall. Research on this topic is
particularly timely given the value of consumer insights
for deriving supply chain strategy (Esper &
Peinkofer, 2017; Ta et al., 2015) around a firm's sustainability efforts.

2.2 | Product recalls
Just as SCT can be considered an integrity signal, the
issuance of a product recall can be considered within the
capability dimension of signal types. Such signals indicate the “ability to perform” (Paruchuri et al., 2021,
p. 563), which in the case of a product recall, would indicate a capability failure. A capability failure of this type
not only has direct and immediate financial consequences (e.g., Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011; Zhao
et al., 2013), but more broadly represents an unplanned
supply chain disruption (Craighead et al., 2007) that “presents a serious threat to the normal course of business
operations of the focal firm” (Bode & Macdonald, 2017,
p. 838). Such events can lead to lost sales or stockouts in
the immediate term (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005;
Riddalls & Bennett, 2002), but recalls can also lead to
lower brand reputation and equity (Dawar &

3 | THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
3.1 | Overview
Signaling theory provides a framework to explain the
behavior of two parties—the signaler and the receiver –
under the condition of information asymmetry (Connelly
et al., 2011; Spence, 1973, 2002). The signaler is the more
informed party, possessing information not fully available to the receiver, who might find the information useful in the decision-making process (Stiglitz, 2002). To
mitigate information asymmetry and convey its
unobservable quality, the more informed party can send
a signal to the receiver (Connelly et al., 2011). However,
the signal's effectiveness depends primarily on (1) observability and (2) credibility (Connelly et al., 2011; Gulati &
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Higgins, 2003; Price & Dawar, 2002; Wells et al., 2011).
Observability refers to the extent to which a receiver can
notice the signal (Connelly et al., 2011), and credibility
refers to the potential for the sender's experience of loss
of standing (e.g., loss of reputation, monetary loss) should
a wrong signal be sent (Boulding & Kirmani, 1993).
Signaling theory has been applied to explain a variety of phenomena in marketing (Moon & Shugan, 2018;
Yim et al., 2019) and operations management (Dai
et al., 2012; Hofer et al., 2012; Rao et al., 2018). For
instance, Yan et al. (2020) used signaling theory to
explain the role of supplier ties as signals in buyer–
supplier relationships, and Rao et al. (2018) explored a
retailer's return policy leniency as a signal. Signaling
theory has also been used to explain how signals can
convey unobservable product quality under information
asymmetry between a manufacturer and consumers
(Kirmani & Rao, 2000), and subsequently affect consumer reactions such as purchase intentions (Wells
et al., 2011) or willingness to pay (Rao et al., 2018).
While the seller of the product (the brand owner/manufacturer, or the retailer, for example) possesses considerable information about the product, consumers lack that
same level of information (Rao et al., 2018). Thus,
consumers may have difficulty assessing a product's
quality prior to making a purchase. The seller can
reduce information asymmetry by using observable and
credible signals to convey the unobservable product
quality to consumers (Kirmani & Rao, 2000; Rao
et al., 1999). Consequently, consumers rely on such
signals to make inferences about a product's quality and
to guide their purchasing decision process.

3.2 | Signal sets
While signaling theory has traditionally focused on the
transmission and reception of one signal (Connelly
et al., 2011), in reality a receiver might be exposed to
multiple signals simultaneously coming from the same or
different senders. These could be signals from different
departments within the same firm being directed at consumers, or could be signals from different organizations
about a firm-related issue (e.g., a 3rd party organization
might be reporting on a company's sustainability efforts
separately from the firm's own messaging) (Connelly
et al., 2011; Paruchuri et al., 2021). Recent research
extends signaling theory by exploring how signal
receivers process and interpret multiple signals
(Plummer et al., 2016). A signal set can consist of signals
that are either on the same (intradimensional) or different (interdimensional) evaluative dimensions (Paruchuri
et al., 2021).
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Considering a B2C context, consumers derive
unobserved product quality perceptions based on multiple signals from their environment. Specifically, impression formation research suggests that integrity and
capability are two fundamental dimensions which a person uses to formulate an impression (Mishina et al., 2012;
Wojciszke et al., 1998). In this research, SCT forms the
focal signal, constituting a positive signal along the evaluative dimension of integrity. To reduce the asymmetry
between manufacturers and consumers and communicate the unobservable quality of products (Connelly
et al., 2011; Kirmani & Rao, 2000; Rao et al., 1999;
Spence, 2002), manufacturers can intentionally disclose
supply chain sustainability information (e.g., on the
firm's website). Consumers can use this observable information to make inferences about product quality. However, considering that consumers are exposed to a
multitude of signals in the marketplace, the effectiveness
of the positive SCT signal will depend on additional signals from the environment. One specific concern companies have with providing SCT is the potential responses
from consumers if a negative event should occur
(Sodhi & Tang, 2019).
A product recall is the negative event of interest in
this research and can be construed as a negative quality
signal (Ketchen et al., 2014), essentially an operational
failure along the capability dimension. Taken together,
when a firm provides SCT to its consumers and experiences a capability failure in the form of a product recall,
an interdimensional signal set is formed. Consumers
receiving both signals will process this incongruent signal
set in order to derive unobservable product quality. However, to date only limited research has examined the
effect of interdimensional signal sets that include both
positive and negative signals (Paruchuri et al., 2021;
Plummer et al., 2016; Stern et al., 2014).
The impression formation view supplements our signaling theory lens to guide our theorization of how consumers will interpret this interdimensional set of
incongruent signals. While impression formation literature suggests that a negative integrity signal is generally
more diagnostic than a positive one and a positive capability signal is more diagnostic than a negative one
(Mishina et al., 2012; Wojciszke et al., 1998), the
diagnosticity of a signal is context dependent. Specifically, the extremity of a signal as well as the relevancy to
one's self-interest influences how much weight a person
would assign to the signal (Fiske, 1980). In exploring the
magnitude and temporal aspects of interdimensional signal sets, the experiments described in the following sections enable us to evaluate various conditions of a
positive integrity signal coupled with a negative capability signal to better understand the diagnosticity of two
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types of signals that consumers might receive regarding a
firm's supply chain operations.

4 | T H E MA G N I T U D E O F I N T E R DIMENSIONAL SI G N AL
INCONGRUIT Y
In Appendix B (Pretest 2) we establish that SCT as a positive integrity signal alone has a positive effect on consumers' product quality perceptions. However,
consumers do not receive signals in isolation and hence,
the effect of SCT might depend on additional signals that
consumers receive from the environment. Mixed signals
can produce various purchase intentions, depending on
the magnitude of interdimensional signal incongruity
created. Product recalls vary in severity (Craighead
et al., 2007), ranging from low severity recalls unlikely to
cause adverse health consequences (e.g., mislabeling of
weights), to high severity recalls that are very likely to
cause adverse health consequences (e.g., food-borne illnesses) (FDA, 2014). In our contextual setting, in which a
product recall constitutes a negative event, consumers
are expected to more heavily weigh the negative product
recall signal over the positive SCT signal. This will be exacerbated for the high-severity recalls due to the direct impact
on consumer well-being. Thus, the negative capability signal is likely to have a stronger impact on consumer reactions than the impact of the positive integrity signal
(Coombs, 2007). When recall severity is high, interdimensional signal incongruity is elevated since the high
expectations set forward by the SCT signal are incongruent
with the recall severity signal indicating poor product quality. The positive signal of SCT coupled with the negative signal of high recall severity is likely to generate a high level of
incongruence, making the interpretation of this interdimensional signal set ambiguous for consumers (Gioia &
Chittipeddi, 1991). We expect consumers will pay more
attention to the extreme negative capability signal (product
recall) because it is highly relevant to the consumer's personal well-being. Essentially, the positive effect of SCT on
quality perceptions and repurchase intentions will diminish
if the negative signal outweighs the positive signal.
Conversely, a weak negative signal of low recall severity could indicate to consumers that the firm is concerned
about the well-being of consumers (Germann et al., 2014;
Ketchen et al., 2014) which would conform to the expectations set by the positive SCT signal. Hence, the weak
negative signal of low recall severity is likely to generate
less interdimensional incongruity with the positive signal
of SCT, and the interpretation of this interdimensional
signal set is likely to be less ambiguous (Gioia &
Chittipeddi, 1991). Therefore, in the SCT/low severity
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recall set, we expect consumers to weigh the negative
information less heavily than in the high severity recall
scenario, such that the effect of SCT on quality perceptions and repurchase intentions will be stronger than in
the high severity recall scenario.
H1. The positive effect of SCT on purchase intention through product quality is stronger for a low
severity recall than for a high severity recall.

4.1 | Overview of research methodology
Following prior work (Abbey et al., 2017; Ball et al., 2018;
Li et al., 2013; Peinkofer et al., 2015; Ta et al., 2018), we
recruited participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) for our pretests and two main experiments.
MTurk participants have been shown to provide reliable
results (Goodman et al., 2013) and have also been shown
to be more attentive than traditional subject samples
(Hauser & Schwarz, 2016).
All participants were randomly assigned to one of the
experimental scenarios and compensated with $0.70 for
their participation. To ensure high data quality, we eliminated participants who missed the attention check question and, where applicable, we also removed participants
who failed the memory recall manipulation check
(Abbey & Meloy, 2017). Participants were limited to a
single experiment and were excluded from future pools
after initial participation. Given the nature of scenariobased experiments, we employed realism checks to
ensure reliability of the experimental designs (Thomas
et al., 2010). We used a two-item, 7-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree/7 = strongly agree) that (1) asked
participants to assess whether the described shopping
situation was realistic and (2) whether they had any difficulty imagining themselves in the shopping scenario.
Table 1 summarizes the experimental procedures as well
as the demographic profile of each sample.
Two factors carried through all our experiments:
(1) SCT and (2) signal credibility. To develop our baseline
experimental scenarios, we followed the guidelines of
Rungtusanatham et al. (2011). In the pre-design stage, we
conducted research on food supply chains. Because dairy
products constitute a significant number of total food recalls
(Maberry, 2018), dairy products became our focal product
category. We visited multiple firms' websites to understand
how they communicate supply chain sustainability information to consumers. As websites can be effective for communicating with consumers (Schlosser et al., 2006), we
created a website for a fictional dairy product firm,
DairyMade, mimicking websites that present supply chain
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TABLE 1

7

Experimental procedures
Experiments
Pretest 1

Pretest 2

Pretest 3

1

2

Recruits from Mturk

192

92

251

206

186

Compensation

$0.70

$0.70

$0.70

$0.70

$0.70

Eliminations due to failed
attention check

17

2

28

31

14

Elimination due to failed memory
recall manipulation check

N/A

N/A

10

N/A

N/A

Outliers

0

0

0

0

2

Final sample size

175

90

213

175

170

Duration

8 min 15 s

8 min. 40 s

8 mm. 59 s

9 min. 54 s

10 min. 49 s

Average age (range)

31.97(18–72)

41.02(21–75)

35.89(18–76)

31.33(21–61)

39.81(19–77)

Female/male/other

28%/ 72%

41%/58%/1%

42%/ 58%

32%/ 68%

61%/ 40%

Median household income

$40–$49 k

$50–$59 k

$40–$49 k

$40–$49 k

$40–$49 k

% with some college

90.9%

93.3%

87.3%

93.7%

89.4%

Ratings range:
5.75 to 6.09

Ratings range:
6.16 to 6.46

Ratings range:
5.90 to 6.20

Ratings range:
5.78 to 6.02

Ratings range:
5.90 to 6.40

Realism checks

sustainability information. We developed common module
statements (held constant across all experimental conditions) and developed the experimental module with varying
statements, depending on the experimental condition of
SCT and signal credibility. High SCT (low SCT) was represented by abundant (limited) information about sustainable
sourcing practices. The design element representing signal
credibility was a certificate for the sustainable supply chain
practices accompanied by a description of the certification
process. High credibility was reflected by including a
description of the significant amount of time, money, and
resources invested to become certified, whereas low credibility was indicated by describing the certification process as
neither time- nor resource-intensive.
We conducted three initial pretests (details of all pretests
are provided in the appendices). Pretest 1 (Appendix A)
ensured the validity of the experimental manipulations
for SCT and signal credibility. All subsequent experiments were embedded within the high credibility context, in line with our theoretical lens of signaling theory.
Pretest 2 (Appendix B) provided statistical evidence that
high SCT leads to higher perceptions of product quality
than does low SCT (β1 = .651, p = .001). Pretest
3 (Appendix C) provided statistical evidence for our theoretical foundation that consumers weigh the negative
information of a product recall (capability signal) more
heavily than the positive SCT information (integrity signal). The coefficient of a product recall on perceived
product quality is significantly larger than the coefficient for SCT with F (1, 210) = 36.52, p < .001. After

testing and establishing these theoretical foundations,
we proceeded with Experiment 1.

4.2 | Experiment 1
Experiment 1 constitutes a 2 (SCT: low vs. high)  2
(recall severity: low vs. high) between-subjects design. In
addition to using the manipulations for SCT employed in
the pretests, we manipulated the recall severity. Participants in the low recall severity condition were informed
that “DairyMade has issued a recall on one of its dairy
products due to incorrect weight labeling on the milk
bottles. The mislabeling of weight will NOT cause any
harmful health consequences.” Participants in the high
recall severity condition were informed that “DairyMade
has issued a recall on one of its dairy products due to the
toxin listeria monocytogenes being found in its dairy
product. The contaminated product can cause harmful
health consequences or even death for vulnerable consumers. Infected people may experience symptoms such
as fever, stiff neck, confusion, weakness, vomiting, sometimes preceded by diarrhea.”
We measured recall severity with two 7-point Likert
items asking participants to evaluate two statements:
(1) “The recall issued by DairyMade is very severe” and
(2) “The recall issued by DairyMade is very impactful.”
To assess the validity of our manipulations, we ran a
MANOVA using perceived amount of information disclosed and perceived recall severity as dependent variables
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TABLE 2

Experiment 1 PROCESS Model 8 results
Model 1

Predictors
Constant

Model 2

DV: Perceived quality

p-value

DV: Purchase intention

p-value

0.290

.041

2.673(0.654)

.000

.542

0.616

.456

(0.141)
SCT

0.119
(0.195)
0.967

Severity

(0.827)
.000

(0.198)
SCT*Severity

0.390
(0.273)

Perceived quality

.154

0.129

2

.111

.997

(1.109)
2.956 (0.526)

F-value (df )

R

0.871
(0.546)

12.89

2LL = 90.75

(3, 171)

(df = 4)

p < .001

p < .002

.18

Pseudo R2 = .66

.000

Note: SE are presented in parentheses.

and SCT (using the same measures as in the pretests) and
severity of recall (1 = high severity/0 = low severity) as
independent variables. A significant main effect occurs
for SCT with F (1,171) = 38.35, p < .001, indicating that
participants in the high SCT condition perceived that
DairyMade had disclosed significantly more information
(MHigh_SCT = 5.10) than did those in the low SCT condition (MLow_SCT = 3.62). Participants in the high severity
recall condition perceived the recall as being more severe
(MHigh_Severity = 5.37) than participants in the low severity recall condition (MLow_severity = 3.21) with F
(1,171) = 80.95, p < .001. No significant cross effects or
interaction effects were observed. Thus, the validity of
our experimental manipulations is confirmed.
The variables of interest were perceived product quality and purchase intention. Perceived product quality was
measured with a three-item, 7-point Likert scale adapted
from Sprott and Shimp (2004) (Cronbach's α = .926). The
scale items are provided in Appendix B. Purchase intention was measured with a binary outcome variable that
asked participants whether they would purchase a
DairyMade product:

y¼

1
0

would purchase
would not purchase

4.3 | Analysis and results
Per best practices, we extracted the factor scores for quality perception using MPlus's Bayesian estimator

(Calantone et al., 2017). Factor scores are preferable to an
average of respective scale items (Aiken et al., 1991)
because factor scores allow indicators with larger factor
loadings to have a greater impact on a participant's latent
variable scores (Calantone et al., 2017).
Regression results after running PROCESS Model
8 with 20,000 bootstrap samples (Hayes, 2017) are shown
in Table 2. The factor score of perceived product quality
was used as the mediator and purchase intention (binary)
as our dependent variable. SCT (1 = high SCT/0 = low
SCT) and recall severity (1 = high severity/0 = low severity) were used as independent variables.
While the conditional indirect effect for low severity
is not significant (effect size = 0.351; CI[0.516; 1.435])
the conditional indirect effect for high severity is significant (effect size = 1.505; CI[0.199; 3.384]). However, the
index of moderated mediation is not significant
(index = 1.154; CI[0.452; 3.137], indicating that the
respective conditional indirect effect sizes are not significantly different. Thus, H1 is not supported.
Contrary to expectations, the effect of SCT on purchase intention through quality perception does not
depend on recall severity since adding the interaction
between SCT and recall severity did not significantly
improve the R2 change (Δ = 0.0100 F = 2.05 [1, 171];
p = .154). We therefore conducted a post hoc analysis to
more fully explore the relationship of the interdimensional signal incongruence of SCT and recall severity by estimating a simple mediation model (PROCESS
Model 4), as presented in Table 3. The indirect effects
suggest that regardless of the recall severity, participants
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TABLE 3
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Experiment 1 PROCESS Model 4 results
Model 1

Predictors
Constant

Model 2

DV: Perceived quality

p-value

0.189

.125

(0.121)
SCT

0.317
0.762
(0.137)

Perceived quality

p-value

2.711

.000

(0.570)
.022

(0.137)
Severity

DV: Purchase intention

0.687

.221

(0.562)
.000

0.080

.888

(0.562)
2.951

.000

(0.562)
F-value (df )

R

2

18.19

2LL = 90.77

(2, 172)

(df = 3)

p < .001

p < .001

.18

Pseudo R2 = .66

Note: SE are presented in parentheses.

in the high SCT condition are 2.55 times more likely to
purchase a DairyMade product due to higher product
quality perceptions (effect size = 0.936; CI[0.146; 2.076];
odds ratio = 2.55) than participants in the low SCT condition. Regardless of the level of SCT, in the event of a
high severity recall participants are less likely to purchase
a DairyMade product owing to lower perceived quality
than when there is a low severity recall (effect
size = 2.49; CI[3.838; 1.400]; odds ratio = 0.09). In
essence, participants are 11.112 times more likely to purchase a DairyMade product when there is a low severity
recall than when there is a high severity recall.
We were unable to support our expectations that the
positive effect of SCT would be stronger in a low severity
recall scenario than in a high severity recall scenario due
to the different level of interdimensional signal incongruence. Rather, our results suggest that the effect of SCT is
not conditional on the severity of the recall, suggesting
the level of interdimensional signal incongruity is perceived by consumers to be similar. In other words, in
both the case of the SCT/low recall severity signal set and
the SCT/high recall severity signal set, consumers assign
more weight to the negative capability signal than to the
positive integrity signal. Although the negative capability
signal of a product recall can dampen perceptions of
product quality and reduce purchase intentions, the positive effect of the positive integrity signal of SCT persists.
This finding suggests that disclosing sustainability information can to some degree preempt the negative outcomes associated with product recalls since consumers
appear to downplay the negative information of the product recall signal, regardless of the level of signal

incongruence. Recent work has highlighted that positive
perceptions can cushion negative information, such as
when stakeholders blame firms less for wrongdoing when
they are known to be engaged in corporate social responsibility activities (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015) or corporate
philanthropy (Lungeanu et al., 2018).

5 | TEMPORAL EFFECTS OF
INTERDIMENSIONAL SIGNAL
IN CO NG RU ITY
While Experiment 1 considered the magnitude of interdimensional signal incongruence, Experiment 2 addresses
the temporal effects of a negative capability signal (product recall) followed by a positive integrity signal (SCT)—
a particularly important issue for companies seeking to
mitigate the consequences of negative events such as a
product recall. Therefore, Experiment 2 shifts the focus
to interdimensional signal incongruity over time by theorizing within-subjects effects and adopting a withinsubjects experimental design.
To test the temporal effects of the positive integrity
signal (SCT) after a negative capability signal (recall
event), we first establish the baseline impact of a recall
on the change in consumers' perceptions prior to SCT
exposure. Thus, we theorize the within-subjects effect of
the change in consumers' quality perceptions due to low
and high severity recalls. In establishing the baseline
impact of both high and low severity recalls on consumer
perceptions, we fall back on the logic presented in Experiment 1. A high severity recall situation constitutes a
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more extreme negative capability signal than a low severity recall situation. Since more extreme information
receives more weight and attention from consumers than
less extreme information (Fiske, 1980), the high severity
recall will be more diagnostic than the low severity recall.
Thus, consumers are expected to have a greater decrease
in their product quality perceptions in the case of a high
severity than a low severity recall (Germann et al., 2014;
Korkofingas & Ang, 2011).
H2. Consumers experiencing a high severity
recall will have a greater decrease in quality
perceptions than consumers experiencing a low
severity recall.
We now theorize about the within-subjects effect of a
consumer's change in quality perceptions when the positive integrity signal of SCT is introduced, creating interdimensional signal incongruence. Prior research suggests
that more salient signals are easier to recall and thus, will
be integrated by consumers in their interpretation of a
signal set (Drover et al., 2018). When introduced to a SCT
signal after initially receiving a product recall signal, consumers will reevaluate the negative capability signal of a
product recall in the context of the positive integrity signal of SCT. At that point in time the positive integrity signal of SCT will be more salient to consumers, having
temporally followed the negative capability signal.
Hence, in line with impression formation literature, the
positive SCT signal should receive more attention from
consumers. We therefore expect to see a reversal of the
negative trend in quality perceptions (predicted in H2),
regardless of recall severity.
H3. Regardless of the severity of the recall,
SCT will lead to an increase in quality
perceptions.
A high severity recall (negative) followed by SCT
(positive) constitutes a sequence of interdimensional and
incongruent signals in which the information is incompatible (Zhao & Zhou, 2011). Similarly, a low severity
recall (weak negative) followed by SCT (positive) also
forms a sequence of interdimensional and incongruent
signals; however, in the latter scenario, consumers
should perceive the information in the two signals as
only minimally ambiguous (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).
Given the temporal sequence of the two signals, the initial decrease in product quality perceptions predicted in
H2 should subsequently be disconfirmed (Oliver, 1981)
by the positive signal of SCT, leading to higher product
quality perceptions. In both recall severity scenarios, this
increase should be larger the more transparent a firm is

about its supply chain sustainability practices since the
more information a firm discloses, the greater the signal's
observability, thus invoking stronger changes in product
quality perceptions.
H4. Regardless of the severity of the recall,
high SCT leads to greater increases in quality
perceptions than does low SCT.

5.1 | Experiment 2
Experiment 2 constitutes a 2 (recall severity: low
vs. high) x 2 (SCT: low vs. high) mixed factorial design.
As in Experiment 1, we manipulated recall severity and
SCT. However, the focus of this experiment was to
explore the change in consumer perceptions over time
with SCT as a positive integrity signal following a recall
as a negative capability signal. Hence, all participants
were first exposed to some general information about
DairyMade and then asked to assess the quality of
DairyMade's products to get some baseline measures
(Time 1). Next, participants were exposed to either a low
or a high severity recall, after which they again indicated
their quality perceptions (Time 2). Finally, DairyMade
provided either low or high SCT signals to consumers.
After the exposure to SCT, participants once more indicated their quality perceptions (Time 3) as well as their
purchase intentions. We used the same manipulation
check measures as in Experiment 1 and our manipulations worked as intended, supporting their validity. We
adopted the same measures for product quality as in
Experiment 1. We extracted the factor scores for product
quality for the pooled data using MPlus's Bayesian estimator (Calantone et al., 2017). This approach is in line
with other work extracting factor scores for longitudinal
data (Muir et al., 2019).

5.2 | Analysis and results
To test H2–H4, which focus on change over time and
thus the within-subjects effect of quality perceptions, we
ran a mixed effects model using the xtmixed command in
STATA. We estimated a linear spline model with one
knot at Time 2 and an unstructured covariance matrix.
Linear spline models accommodate non-linear trends
over time (Fitzmaurice et al., 2012), as we observed in
our data. Linear spline models “divide the time axis into
a series of segments and consider a model for the trend
over time that is composed of piecewise linear trends,
having different slopes within each segment but joined or
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TABLE 4
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Experiment 2 linear spline model

DV: Quality
Constant

Coefficient

p-value

1.366

.000

(0.225)
Timespline 1

1.245

.000

(0.152)
Severity*Timespline 1
Low severity Time2

1.139

.000

(0.167)
High Severity Time1

0.180

.184

(0.135)
Timespline 2

1.178

.000

(0.212)

FIGURE 1
over time

Experiment 2 change of quality perceptions

Severity*Timespline2
Low severity Time3

0.375

.022

(0.163)
SCT*Timespline2
Low SCT Time3

0.360

.044

(0.179)
High SCT Time2

0.251

.062

(0.134)
SCT*Severity*Timespline2
High SCT High Severity
Time 3
High SCT High Severity
Time2

0.178

.347

(0.189)
0.115

.545

(0.251)

Reml = 545.19, p = .000
Wald Chi2 (df = 9) = 329.91
AIC = 1122.38
Note: SE are presented in parentheses.

tied together at fixed times” (Fitzmaurice et al., 2012,
p. 149). Table 4 summarizes the results.3
Overall, our results show that there is a significant
decrease in consumer quality perception from Time 1 to
Time 2 (timespline 1) (β = 1.245 p < .001). As expected,
the decrease of quality perceptions is significantly larger
for a high severity than a low severity recall
(contrast = 1.319, p < .001), supporting H2. Pairwise
comparisons show that consumers experiencing a low
severity recall indicate no significant decrease in quality
perception from Time 1 to Time 2 (contrast = 0.106,
p = .221). In comparison, consumers experiencing a high
severity recall indicate a significant decrease in quality
perception from Time 1 to Time 2 (contrast = 1.425,
p < .001). For timespline 2 we observe a significant coefficient (β = 1.178, p < .001) indicating a positive change in

slope from the first time segment (Time1/Time2) to the second time segment (Time2/Time3) supporting H3. Furthermore, pairwise comparisons show that regardless of the
recall severity, when SCT is low a significant change in
quality perceptions occurs from Time 2 to Time 3 (contrast
0.632, p < .001). Similarly, when SCT is high, a significant
change occurs in quality perceptions from Time 2 to Time
3 (contrast = 0.755, p < .001). Results show that regardless
of recall severity, the increase of quality perceptions due to
low and high SCT is equal (contrast = 0.122, p = .253).
Thus, H4 is not supported. Figure 1 illustrates the change of
quality perception over time.
Our results show that consumers' quality perceptions
decrease to a greater extent for a high severity recall than
for a low severity recall. In line with our theorizing, this
finding provides support for consumers weighting
extreme negative capability information (high severity
recall) more than less extreme negative capability information (low severity recall). Subsequently, a positive
integrity signal (SCT) following a negative capability signal (product recall) serves as a strategic tool to regain
positive product quality perceptions. This finding specifically shows that considering the temporal sequence of
signals received, consumer will reevaluate the negative
capability signal which was received first in the light of
the positive integrity signal. Since the positive integrity
signal (SCT) followed the negative capability signal
(product recall), the former appears to be more salient in
consumers' minds and hence, will be weighted more,
leading to a positive change in product quality perceptions. Thus, regardless of recall severity, a firm making
an effort to disclose supply chain sustainability information will be positively evaluated by consumers, as demonstrated by the increase in consumer quality perceptions.
Lastly, contrary to our predictions, the increase we
observed in consumer quality perceptions does not differ
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between providing low or high SCT. Therefore, low SCT
is equally strong in positively impacting consumer sentiments after a recall occurs. From a theoretical perspective, this finding suggests that in our context consumers
experienced similar interdimensional signal incongruity
leading to equal increases in perceived quality.

6 | DISCUSSION AND
I M P L I C A T IO N S
6.1 | SCT as a strategic tool
Providing SCT to external stakeholders, such as consumers, is a challenging and difficult endeavor (Sodhi &
Tang, 2019). Not only does a firm need to have sufficient
internal visibility as a prelude to disclosure of any information to external parties, the costs and challenges of
providing relevant and accurate information are not
insignificant. While gaining consumers' trust may be the
ultimate rationale for providing transparency, the benefits of providing SCT are still not clearly established
(Sodhi & Tang, 2019). This research begins to address
that knowledge deficit, demonstrating the strategic value
of providing sustainable supply chain information to
consumers.
As demonstrated by the experimental approach
employed in this research, we were able to isolate the
causal effect of SCT on product quality perception and
consumer purchase intentions. The experimental
approach demonstrated the strategic value of SCT as a
positive integrity signal to consumers, even when
received with an incongruent negative product recall signal. Within the theoretical domain of signaling theory,
the contextual specificity of sustainable supply chain
practices provided an opportunity to better understand
the mechanism by which SCT influences consumers' perceptions. Thus, our middle range theory approach focusing on outcomes based on mechanisms within a specific
context (Pawson & Tilley, 1997; Stank et al., 2017)
enabled us to begin to address the knowledge gap identified by Sodhi and Tang (2019) regarding the benefits
of SCT.
Growing pressure from consumers wanting to know
more about the products they buy (Duan, Hofer, &
Aloysius, 2021; Nichols et al., 2019), coupled with
recalls demonstrate the need for firms' disclosures to
their consumers, often in complex situations in which
incongruent signal sets may be received by consumers.
Because transparency is considered an antecedent to
organizational trustworthiness (Schnackenberg &
Tomlinson, 2016), this research supports the strategic
importance of managing disclosure about a firm's
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sustainability initiatives. Disclosure to external stakeholders becomes an important aspect of relationshipbuilding with stakeholders (in this case, consumers),
and supports the importance of sustainable supply
chain management as part of organizational strategy.
Even when coupled with the operational failure of a
product recall that could impact consumer well-being,
the value of transparency was demonstrated as part of
the overall relationship firms develop with their consumers. Not only did SCT help shield companies from
consumers' negative quality perceptions following a
recall, but even low levels of SCT were found to help
recover from negative perceptions when SCT followed
a recall event. While these findings are encouraging,
they do not suggest that SCT is a panacea for all that
could go wrong in the supply chain. SCT, as a positive
integrity signal, cannot simply be conjured up on the
spot in the face of a crisis (exemplified in this research
as a product recall). The ability to be transparent about
sustainability efforts takes time and planning (Sodhi &
Tang, 2019), suggesting the need to view sustainability
efforts and related disclosure capabilities as part of a
firm's overall supply chain strategy. But more research
needs to be conducted to understand issues related to
how much and when to employ transparency efforts.
For example, in Experiment 2, the transparency signal
disclosing the firm's sustainability efforts was effectively received immediately following a participant's
knowledge of the recall. In such an immediate sense,
even low levels of SCT helped reverse participants'
product quality perceptions. How much SCT would be
needed if the disclosure came sometime later, and at
what point would such disclosure have no effect? In
the rather simplified format of Experiment 2, these
questions cannot be fully answered, but the results
point out the need for further research to address more
complex situations regarding how much SCT and over
what timeframe SCT provides value for firms in product recall contexts.
More generally, the effectiveness of SCT in other contexts needs to be explored to identify the boundaries of
the magnitude and timing effects we identified within a
mixed signal set. Further research should focus on
exploring the robustness and pervasiveness of incongruent signal set effects in different supply chain and operations management contexts to enhance theoretical
understanding of the role and impact of signal sets. By
recognizing that events that occur within the supply
chain serve as signals to consumers who actively interpret those signals in determining how (whether) to interact with a firm, supply chain researchers can further
explore a variety of signals that might be relevant to consumers. Importantly, the mix of signals consumers
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receive, as well as their representation as integrity and/or
capability characteristics, needs further attention by
scholars. The complexity of mixed-signal sets, especially
when signals are incongruent, provides an opportunity
for researchers to further explore the firm-consumer relationship. In particular, future research needs to develop a
broader theoretical understanding of the role of SCT as
one of many signals consumers receive. Previous operations and supply chain management research has begun
to examine the effect of information disclosure on consumer responses (Allon & Bassamboo, 2011; Peinkofer
et al., 2016; Ta et al., 2018), and our research continues
that trend by casting disclosure to consumers as a strategic sustainability initiative with broad implications for
firm performance.

6.2 | Implications for signaling theory
Our research also augments recent advances in signaling
theory (Paruchuri et al., 2021; Plummer et al., 2016; Stern
et al., 2014) with insights from impression formation literature (Fiske, 1980; Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990;
Skowronski & Carlston, 1989) to theorize how consumers
process positive and negative information contained in signal sets. While signaling theory broadly supports the diagnostic superiority of integrity over capability dimensions
(Paruchuri et al., 2021), the diagnostic value of SCT and
product recall signals has not been explored previously. In
our context, both the extremity and the relevancy of the
signal to the well-being of the consumer determine the
diagnosticity of the signal. Considering that a product
recall can directly impact the well-being of a consumer,
the negative signal of a capability failure received more
weight from consumers than the positive SCT integrity signal. However, we expected differential outcomes based on
the magnitude of the interdimensional signal incongruence between the SCT and product recall signals. Yet, in
our setting, the positive effect of SCT persisted regardless
of the level of recall severity.
In addition, while prior operations and supply chain
management researchers have explored the role of one signal (Allon & Bassamboo, 2011; Aydinliyim et al., 2017;
Park et al., 2020; Peinkofer et al., 2016), they have yet to
develop theory regarding a supply chain managementrelated signal set. This research provides a timely attempt
to address this theoretical knowledge gap. By exploring
interdimensional signal incongruence, the relative importance of the integrity dimension (operationalized as supply
chain transparency about the firm's sustainability efforts)
was demonstrated vis-à-vis the capability dimension
(operationalized as a product recall, an operational failure). Our exploration of interdimensional signaling is an
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important step for supply chain researchers. We found
that even a small integrity signal is sufficient to counteract
a negative capability signal; this covers new ground in signaling theory. In contrast to Paruchuri et al. (2021) who
considered a negative integrity signal with a positive capability signal, we considered the interdimensional set of a
positive integrity signal (SCT) coupled with a negative
capability signal (operational failure of a recall). We did
this to better understand the diagnostic impact of integrity
signals (Stellar & Willer, 2018; Wojciszke et al., 1998),
which helps explain the positive change in product quality
perceptions with even a low level of SCT. But further
research is needed to more fully explore the context and
mechanisms of SCT as a positive integrity signal. Magnitude effects as well as the interdimensional signal sets
across a variety of supply chain contexts should be
explored to further understand the boundary conditions of
signaling theory for supply chain researchers.
We further contribute to signaling theory by theorizing about the temporal sequence of incongruent signals
to better understand the impact of supply chain signaling
on consumers' perceptions over time. As signals are not
necessarily received by consumers at the same time,
understanding the impact of signals' temporal sequence
is important. Although the temporal sequence of multiple
signals has been highlighted as an important theoretical
extension to signaling theory (Plummer et al., 2016;
Taj, 2016), the issue has been largely ignored in both the
general signaling literature and the operations and supply chain management literature. Our research provides
an initial effort to address this theoretical knowledge gap.
Future research could explore the underlying nature of
the relationship of a signal sequence on specified outcomes, which is especially interesting since our results
suggest a nonlinear effect. Additionally, it would be
important to explore different signal sequence compositions (such as a congruent vs. an incongruent signal
sequence) over time.

6.3 | Managerial implications
Our research shows that how an organization manages
its supply chains and communicates its supply chain sustainability practices to consumers can influence the organization's relationship with its consumers. To enhance
organizational trustworthiness, managers should consider SCT as a strategic initiative for fostering and managing customer relationships with the firm. Such efforts
can be particularly important in the face of a supply
chain failure, such as the need to recall products from
the market. Firms that already have sufficient supply
chain visibility to enable disclosure of their sustainability
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practices should recognize that their disclosure efforts
may at least partially shield their companies from negative consumer reactions. Those firms not yet disclosing
sustainability information to consumers may be able to
do so as a means to reshape consumer perceptions in
times of turbulence brought about by negative events
(such as the product recalls in our research). This
approach would be similar to the immediate signaling
approach employed in our Experiment 2, where we demonstrated that even a little bit of SCT can go a long way
in positively impacting consumer sentiments in the event
of a product recall. Of course, such an effort requires sufficient supply chain visibility to be able to disclose relevant information in a credible manner. This requires a
strategic focus on both sustainability and transparency
efforts; our comments here are not intended to imply that
SCT is nothing but a “quick public relations stunt” to distract consumers from a negative event.
Of particular importance when considering the value of
disclosing sustainability information, is that companies cannot always control when, and which signals a consumer
might receive. In the face of the product recall employed in
this research, the underlying consistency of the sustainability signal had positive impact on consumers' perceptions
across various scenarios of magnitude and timing for the
negative signal. Given the supply chain challenges being
faced globally—due to the pandemic, political unrest, as
well as the climate crisis—positive integrity signals such as
the sustainability disclosure employed in the current
research may contribute to a more resilient organization.

7 | LIMITA TI ON S A N D FU T U R E
RESEARCH
While experimental research designs provide strength in
detecting causality and testing the underlying theoretical
mechanisms, which align with the goals of this research,
we traded internal validity for external validity. Thus, this
research should only be evaluated within its boundaries.
To overcome the limitations of the current research setting and to demonstrate a broader range and scope of the
role of SCT across contexts and over time, future research
could employ different methodological approaches to
provide external validity. In addition, more research is
needed to more fully explore signal sets as perceived by
consumers. A sustainability signal that gets lost in the
cacophony of signal noise would be a waste of effort,
time, and money for managers. Hence, future research
could integrate additional signals consumers might be
exposed to in the signaling environment, such as product
attributes, price, brand information, or firm reputation.
Such an extension would further contribute to a broader
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stream of SCT research to complement our initial experimental findings and shed light on the role of SCT in a
noisy signaling environment.
From a theoretical perspective, while the premises of signaling theory provided a foundation for our research, our
theoretical approach and results suggest that incorporating
aspects from impression formation literature (Fiske, 1980;
Skowronski & Carlston, 1989) offers a promising avenue to
build signaling theory in operations and supply chain management. Future research could integrate an impression formation approach to enhance the theoretical understanding
of how and why consumers use operations and supply
chain-related signals to develop quality perceptions.
Finally, while we were explicit about SCT being an
intentional disclosure by the company, we did not ascribe
ownership of the recall signal to the company itself.
Future research needs to address situations in which the
company explicitly controls the mixed signals to better
understand how and when to disclose information to
consumers. Duan, Hofer, and Aloysius (2021) acknowledge the important role that supply chain managers play
in a firm's ability to disclose relevant information accurately. But future research also needs to explore the difference in effectiveness of mixed signals when received
from the same vs. different senders.
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ENDN OTE S
1

Not all recalls are initiated or initially communicated by firms.
The US Food & Drug Administration can and does initiate product recalls, forcing companies to comply with their recall mandates (FDA, 2021). Our focus is not on the initiator of the product
recall messaging, but consumers' reactions to mixed messaging.

2

Due to the mathematical characteristic of the invariance of the

1
.
odds ratio, the reciprocal odds ratio for 0.09 is 11.11 0:09

3

As indicated in Table 1, we detected two outliers in the sample.
These were eliminated for analysis purposes, but we also estimated
our models including the two outliers and achieved similar results.
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A PP E ND IX A : PRETEST 1
Purpose: Establish validity of experimental manipulations: Supply Chain Transparency (SCT) and signal
credibility.
Design: 2 (SCT: low vs. high) x 2 (signal credibility:
low vs. high) between-subjects design. See Figure A1
for a visualization of the four basic scenarios. See
Table A1 for a description of the Pretest 1 sample.
Manipulation check measures
SCT: is a one-item 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly
disagree/7 = strongly agree) asking participants
to evaluate whether DairyMade provided a lot of
information with regard to their supply chain sustainability practices (perceived amount of information
disclosed).
Signal credibility: based on Wells et al. (2011), participants were asked to evaluate three statements on a
7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree/7 = strongly

F I G U R E A 1 A visualization of the basic scenarios. A full set of all scenarios employed across all pretests and experiments is available
from the authors on request
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TABLE A1
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Sample description for pretest 1

Recruits from Mturk

192

Compensation

$0.70

Eliminations due to:

Duration

8 min 15 s

Average age (range)

31.97 (18–72)

Female/Male/Other

28%/72%

Failed attention check

17

Median household income

$40–$49 k

Failed memory recall manipulation check

n/a

% with some college

90.9%

0
175

Realism checks: ratings range

5.75–6.09

Recruits from Mturk

92

Duration

8 min 40 s

Compensation

$0.70

Average age (range)

41.02 (21–75)

Female/Male/Other

41%/58%/1%

Median household income

$50–$59 k

Outliers
Final sample size

TABLE B1

Sample description for pretest 2

Eliminations due to:
Failed attention check
Failed memory recall manipulation check
Outliers
Final sample size

2
n/a

% with some college

93.3%

0
90

Realism checks: ratings range

6.16–6.46

agree) (perception of the resource investment involved with
having sustainability practices certified):
• “DairyMade must have invested significant effort to
become part of the International Dairy Council Sustainability program,”
• “DairyMade must have invested a lot of time to
become part of the International Dairy Council Sustainability program,”
• “DairyMade must have made a significant financial
investment to become part of the International Dairy
Council Sustainability program.”
Manipulation check analysis
MANOVA, using perceived amount of information disclosed and perception of the resource investment involved
with having sustainability practices certified as our dependent variables.
ANOVA results:
• Participants in the low SCT condition perceived that
DairyMade disclosed significantly less information
(MLow_SCT = 3.72) than participants perceived in the
high SCT condition (MHigh_SCT = 5.15) with F
(1, 174) = 33.95, p < .001.
• Participants in the low signal credibility condition perceived significantly fewer costs with having sustainability
practices certified (MLow_credibility = 3.59) than participants in the high credibility condition (MHigh_credibility =
5.80) with F (1, 174) = 82.29, p < .001.

• No significant interactions or cross effects were determined, ruling out confounding effects.

A PP E ND IX B: PRETEST 2

Purpose: To establish that SCT functions as a positive
signal.
Hypotheses:
HAWhen signal credibility is high, high SCT leads to
higher perceived quality perceptions compared with
low SCT.
HBPerceived product quality mediates the effect
between SCT and purchase intention.
Design: a single factor (SCT) with two levels: low versus high between-subjects design. Both experimental conditions are embedded in the high credibility context. See
Table B1 for the description of the Pretest 2 sample.

B.1. | Dependent variables
Perceived product quality was measured with a threeitem, 7-point Likert scale adapted from Sprott and
Shimp (2004). The scale items are provided in Table B2
Purchase intention was measured with a binary outcome variable that asked participants whether they
would purchase a DairyMade product:
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TABLE B2

Pretest 2 CFA results
Standardized
loadings

Scale

Items

Anchors

Perceived Product
Quality

Q1: All things considered, I would say
DairyMade's dairy products are of:

1 = poor overall
quality/

Cronbach
α

0.983

7 = excellent overall
quality
1 = strongly disagree/

Q2: I perceive DiaryMade's dairy products to
be of high quality.

0.873

7 = strongly agree
1 = poor/

Q3: Overall, DairyMade's dairy products are:

.939
0.889

7 = excellent
Note: The model is saturated and thus, goodness-of-fit statistics are not applicable. The variance extracted exceeds 0.5, supporting convergent validity (Fornell
& Larcker, 1981, and the Cronback alpha value exceeds 0.8 (Nunally & Bernstein, 1994).

TABLE B3

Pretest 2 PROCESS Model 8 results
Model 1

Model 2

Predictors

DV: Perceived quality

p-value

DV: Purchase intention

p-value

Constant

0.314

.023

2.566

.000

(0.135)
SCT

0.651
(0.194)

Perceived quality

(0.629)
.001

0.620

.490

(0.899)
1.230

.005

(0.440)
F-value (df )

11.31 (1, 88)

2LL = 45.899
(df = 2)

p = .001

p = .002
Pseudo

R

2

.110

R2 = .274

Note: SE are presented in parentheses.


y¼

1

would purchase

0

would not purchase:

B.2. | Analysis and results
Factor scores: We extracted the factor scores for perceived product quality using MPlus's Bayesian estimator.
Factor scores are preferable to an average of respective
scale items (Aiken et al., 1991) because factor scores
allow indicators with larger factor loadings to have a
greater impact on a participant's latent variable scores
(Calantone et al., 2017).
Hypothesis testing: PROCESS Model 4 with 20,000
bootstrap samples (Hayes, 2017). PROCESS follows the
ordinary least square regression path analysis and uses
bootstrapping to test for direct and especially indirect
effects (Hayes, 2017). The factor score of perceived product quality was used as the mediator and the binary

outcome variable for purchase intention as the dependent
variable. SCT (1 = high SCT/0 = low SCT) was used as
the independent variable. Table B3 summarizes the
regression results.
• HA: High SCT leads to higher perceptions of product
quality than does low SCT (β1 = 0.651, p = 0.001).
Thus, HA is supported.
• HB: Indirect effect shows that participants in the high SCT
condition are 2.23 times more likely to purchase a
DairyMade product owing to higher product quality perceptions than participants in the low SCT condition (effect
size = 0.800, CI[0.258; 1.919]; odds ratio = 2.23). Hence,
perceived product quality mediates the relationship
between SCT and purchase intention. HB is supported.
Summary: Pretest 2 establishes that consumers perceive higher product quality when a firm discloses higher
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levels versus lower levels of credible information related
to its supply chain sustainability practices. This finding
suggests that high levels of information create an easier
“signal” for consumers to observe. Our results also show
that if SCT is perceived to be a credible signal, it is effective as an unobservable indicator of product quality. In
addition, we show that product quality functions as an
important mediator, positively affecting consumer purchase intentions when signal credibility is high.

Shimp (2004). The scale items are provided in Table B2.
Purchase intention was measured with a binary outcome
variable that asked participants whether they would purchase a DairyMade product:

y¼

1
0

would purchase
would not purchase

C.3. | Analysis and results
A P P END I X C: PRETEST 3
Purpose: To establish that the negative capability signal
(product recall) is weighted more than the positive capability signal (SCT).

C.1. | Hypotheses
HCThe magnitude of the effect of a product recall is
larger than the magnitude of the effect of SCT.
Design: a 2 (SCT: low vs. high) x 2 (recall: present
vs. absent) between-subjects design. In addition to the
manipulation used in Pretest 2, we also manipulated
whether a recall happened. Following Berry et al. (2015),
participants in the recall condition were exposed to a
newspaper headline stating, “Recall Alert: DairyMade
has issued a recall on one of its dairy products.” Participants in the no-recall condition were exposed to the filler
headline of “Identity theft laws have flaws” (Table C1)

C.2. | Dependent variables
Perceived product quality was measured with a threeitem, 7-point Likert scale adapted from Sprott and
TABLE C1

Factor scores: We extracted the factor scores for perceived product quality using MPlus's Bayesian estimator.
Hypothesis testing: PROCESS Model 4 with
20,000 bootstrap samples (Hayes, 2017). We used the
factor score of perceived product quality as the
mediator and purchase intention (binary) as our
dependent variable. SCT (1 = high SCT/0 = low SCT)
and recall (1 = recall/0 = no recall) were used as the
independent variables. Table C2 summarizes the
results.
• HC: To test H3, we used the “Test” command in
STATA. Results suggest that the coefficient of recall on
perceived product quality is significantly larger than
the coefficient for SCT with F (1, 210) = 36.52,
p < .001. Hence, HC is supported.
Summary: Pretest 3 provide insights into how consumers process a single set including a positive and a
negative signal. While consumers ascribe more weight
to the negative capability signal of a product recall
than to the positive integrity signal of SCT, our results
also show that the effect of the positive signal of
SCT persists even in light of interdimensional signal
incongruity.

Sample description for Pretest 3

Recruits from Mturk

251

Duration

8 min 59 s

Compensation

$0.70

Average age (range)

35.89 (18–76)

Female/Male/Other

42%/58%

Eliminations due to:
Failed attention check

28

Median household income

$40–$49 k

Failed memory recall manipulation check

10

@ with some college

87.3%

0
213

Realism checks: ratings range

5.90–6.20

Outliers
Final sample size

22
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TABLE C2

Pretest 3 process Model 4 results
Model 1

Predictors
Constant

Model 2

DV: Perceived quality

p-value

0.385

.003

(0.130)
SCT

0.284
0.960
(0.146)

Perceived quality

p-value

2.658

.000

(0.580)
.052

(0.146)
Recall

DV: Purchase intention

0.191
(0.497)

.000

0.871

R

2

2.813

23.54

-2LL = 109.01

(2, 152)

(df = 3)

p < 0.001

p < .001

.18

Pseudo R2 = .70

Note: SE are presented in parentheses.

.111

(0.546)

(0.464)
F-value (df )

.702

.000

